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Africa Review

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.

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Articles

Namibia: Shifting Fortunes of the Multi-Party Conference

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The South African-backed Multi-Party Conference (MPC), a coalition of moderate Namibian political parties, has yet to coalesce into a viable political organization. The largest party in the coalition defected to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in mid-April, while another member is badly split over the issue of cooperation with Pretoria. Although the Conference gained international exposure from its participation in the all-party conference in Lusaka in mid-May,¹ and, from the travel of its leaders in late May to four African countries and the United States, it is far from becoming a credible political alternative to SWAPO within Namibia.

Crumbling Political Support

The MPC suffered a serious setback in April, when the Damara Council, which has the support of Namibia's 75,000 Damara tribesmen, resigned from the group and aligned with SWAPO. The council's leader, Justus Garoeb, flew to Lusaka in early April to confer with the SWAPO leadership, and, during the Lusaka conference, the Damara Council sat with SWAPO, according to US Embassy reporting.

The South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) has badly splintered over its decision to enter the MPC. A group of SWANU dissidents, who oppose any cooperation with Pretoria, met in early March with SWAPO President Nujoma in Lusaka,

As a result of this meeting, SWAPO is convinced that the dissidents

¹ SWAPO and the MPC met in Lusaka from 11 to 13 May 1984 under the joint chairmanship of the South African Administrator General in Namibia and Zambian President Kaunda. The Conference failed in its stated objective of restoring momentum to the stalled Namibian settlement process.

Table 1
Multi-Party Conference

Party	Remarks
Republic Party	White moderate party led by Dirk Mudge, who served as chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1977 to 1982.
Rehoboth Baster Party	Led by Ben Africa; an old political ally of the Republican Party; little support among 30,000 Basters.
South-West Africa National Union (SWANU)	Largely a Herrero party; led by Moses Katjuongua; maintains external wing in Africa and Europe; badly split on cooperation with MPC.
SWAPO-Democrats	Led by Andreas Snipanga; largely Ovambo; has little popular support.
National Party of SWA	Primarily an Afrikaner party with close ties to conservative politicians in South Africa; most popular white party.

have the support of the majority of the party, and that they will lead SWANU out of the MPC by late 1984, according to the same source.

The Conference has been unable to broaden its base of support. It is made up of three black and two white political parties that represent less than 25 percent of the territory's population. Senior SWAPO officials believe that the defection of the Damara Council and

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Table 2
SWAPO's Political Allies ^a

Damara Council of Chiefs	Led by Justus Garoeb; strong support among 75,000 Damara; left MPC in April 1984.
SWANU dissidents	Led by Nora Chase and Gerson Vei; opposed to party's participation in MPC.
National Independence Party	Colored and Nama political party; previously independent of MPC and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA); led by Charles Hartung and Otilie Abrahams.

^a The following political parties sided with SWAPO at the Lusaka Conference, 11-13 May.

the growing influence of the pro-SWAPO group within SWANU have effectively defeated the MPC,

Lusaka Conference—and After

Despite its weakness at home, the Conference—with South African assistance—has had some successes regionally and internationally:

- Much to the discomfort of SWAPO, the Conference gained international stature by participating in the Lusaka meeting. SWAPO's refusal to sign the final communique, however, denied the MPC the legitimacy it sought.
- Following the Lusaka meeting, Conference representatives traveled to four African countries and the United States. In Togo and Ivory Coast, MPC leaders had interviews with the chiefs of state, while in Gabon and Senegal they met with foreign ministry officials.

SWAPO is aware that Pretoria is using the MPC to challenge SWAPO's claim as the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people and is annoyed at having to participate in negotiations with the MPC. [] in [] public statements, SWAPO

leaders have expressed concern with Angolan and Zambian efforts to force them to meet with the MPC. Moreover, the decision by Nujoma to visit West Africa immediately following the MPC's visit is an indication of SWAPO's concern with the MPC's new international role. []

Outlook

SWAPO probably is correct in its assessment of the MPC's present political weakness within Namibia.

[] SWAPO believes that it is stronger politically than at any time since its insurgency began in 1967. For this reason, SWAPO probably would disrupt any future meetings attended by the MPC, continuing the policy of denying legitimacy to all opponents. []

South Africa, however, has devoted considerable attention to the Conference, and the party's failure to win support in Namibia probably has not dissuaded Pretoria from further supporting the movement. Pretoria will continue to fund the MPC covertly and to insist that it must be included in any future negotiations on Namibian independence. []

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South Africa: Zulu Clan Warfare

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Recent clashes between Zulu clans in South Africa, which have resulted in hundreds of deaths, are the latest in a series of internecine battles that have continued for over a century, despite efforts to end them by South African police and Zulu political and clan leaders. Although they pose little threat to internal stability, the increased bloodiness of the fighting has heightened government concerns and strengthens rightwing white arguments for denying blacks political rights.

Endemic Fighting

Zulu clans have traditionally used armed confrontations to settle disputes, some of which would seem trivial to outsiders. Some feuds date back to the rise and fall of the Zulu empire in the 19th century, but the causes of others have long been forgotten, according to the US Embassy. New violence is frequently touched off by cattle thefts, or even trespassing

Opposition party members in Parliament have blamed the clan fighting on government policy, pointing to poor living conditions in the KwaZulu homeland where most of the violence has occurred. About half of the 6 million Zulus in South Africa live in KwaZulu, where the population density is 26 per square mile, compared to the national average of 7.7 per square mile. A local black official told the US Embassy that one area of heavy clan fighting, Umbumbulu (25 miles south of Durban), had 102,000 residents in 1970, but over 300,000 in 1980. The most intense clashes in recent years have taken place in the Msinga District of KwaZulu, a particularly impoverished area, where more than 175 people have died since 1979

Poor living conditions in KwaZulu are a contributing factor, but we believe the conflicts are endemic to the Zulu culture. Ethnic groups in other South African homelands face living conditions that are as bad or worse without regularly engaging in fratricidal

battles. The warrior tradition among the Zulu is stronger than in other South African black cultures, and, as one Zulu chief told a journalist, many young Zulu males look forward to "testing their spears" in battle.

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New Trends

The increase in casualties over the past few years has alarmed government authorities:

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- In March, 35 Zulus were killed during a clash in Msinga that involved more than 2,000 combatants.
- In April, 33 died in a fight in Bergville District, northwest of Pietermaritzburg.
- Over 70 Zulus were killed in battles in Umbumbulu in May and June.

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Moreover, the fighting has spread to rural locations and black townships outside of the traditional areas. The US Embassy reported that a Zulu migrant workers' hostel in the black township of Umlazi near Durban was the scene of a battle in 1980. Police officials also have speculated that the high homicide rates in some black townships are partly a result of clan feuds.

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In the past, groups of clan members would assemble, usually at night, and conduct forays against enemy clans. Today, some clans use highly mobile "hit squads" made up of Zulus who are professional killers and are often armed with automatic weapons, according to the US Embassy. The prevalence of these squads in urban areas has forced many influential Zulus to hire full-time bodyguards.

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Outsiders are becoming increasingly involved in the clan conflicts, according to the press. Security

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Weapons captured from
Zulu warriors [redacted]

South African Police Profile ©

officials reported in 1981 that whites were profiting from the battles by selling arms. A white lieutenant in the South African Army reserve is now serving an eight-year prison sentence for taking part in a clan battle in 1981 in which 14 died. [redacted]

Out of Control

Chief Minister Buthelezi of KwaZulu, leader of the Zulu cultural and political organization Inkatha, has repeatedly implored his fellow tribesmen to halt the killing. Despite his popularity among Zulus, especially those living in rural areas, Buthelezi has been ignored. Even clans headed by Inkatha members have been known to battle each other, according to the US Embassy. In July 1981 the head chiefs of the warring Sithole and Zwane clans met in a closed session of the KwaZulu National Assembly and agreed to a truce. Later that evening, the truce evaporated when five Zwanes were murdered, according to a press report. [redacted]

The South African Police have tried for decades to curb the battles. A special squad was established in Msinga in 1949 to stop the flow of illegal arms into the battle areas and to confiscate weapons produced by the Zulus. The squad has seized more than 6,000 guns over the years, and many more knives, spears, and machetes. Following an incident this January in which three policemen were killed while investigating a clan dispute, the police set up an additional special unit to patrol the conflict-ridden areas, but it has had an inauspicious start. One member was killed while trying to break up a clan battle in April, and, earlier this month in Msinga, clan combatants firing automatic rifles pinned down members of the unit for two hours. [redacted]

Despite their efforts, police officials admit that arms continue to flow into Zulu areas from the cities. The US Embassy reports that massive sweep operations in areas plagued by clan fighting have only a temporary impact as the battle usually resumes after the police withdraw. The police face almost insurmountable logistic problems because of the lack of roads in the region. In addition, police have difficulty gathering information because of the high degree of community support for the combatants, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

The local marijuana industry also complicates police efforts. Profits from the sale of marijuana that is grown in inaccessible areas of KwaZulu are used to buy weapons. Some marijuana smugglers pay the local Zulus in arms rather than cash, according to press reports. [redacted]

Outlook

The clan battles almost certainly will continue. We believe government policies are exacerbating tensions among Zulu clans by adding to the overcrowding in the economically destitute KwaZulu homeland. Moreover, the government is unlikely to devote the necessary resources to eradicate the fighting as long as Zulus—and not whites—are affected by the conflicts. [redacted]

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The Zulu clan fighting, although apolitical, strengthens the hand of rightwing whites who adamantly oppose sharing power with blacks and constantly point to black ethnic disputes throughout Sub-Saharan Africa as evidence of the dangers of black rule. Moreover, the continued fighting undercuts the position of Buthelezi, who is trying to mold the Zulus—the largest single ethnic group in South Africa—into a united political force.

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South Africa: Indicators of Political Instability

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Introduction

In an effort to derive a set of country-specific political instability indicators for the Republic of South Africa, the author interviewed some 40 US experts on South Africa.

The purpose of the interviews was not to assess the current state of South African political stability (and still less to turn the author into an expert on the country) but rather to find out what old South Africa hands would look for as early warnings of political trouble. The experts consulted did not agree with each other in every case. In fact, the same indicator—the expansion of the black middle class, for example—was often seen by one expert as stabilizing and by another as destabilizing.

revolutionary situations, rulers who are confident of their right to rule generally prevail against even heavy opposition, while those regimes divided by self-doubt give way. Depending on the indicator in question, the ruling class in South Africa is defined as: all nonblacks; all whites; the English and Afrikaner commercial and political elite; or the government.

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1. *Are wealthy Indians looking for a way out?* (Many respondents believed that this would be the earliest warning of severe social or political upheaval. They point out that the Indian business community has excellent sources of intelligence and well-grounded fears that it could be the big loser in any major change.)

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Subindicators:

- Are an unusual number of Indian businesses coming on the market?
- Are wealthy Indians seeking to obtain immigrant visas to the United States or other countries for members of their immediate families?
- Are innovative schemes being devised to get Indian capital out of the country?

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The Indicators

In place of the six categories of indicators used in the political instability quarterly, four categories of greater relevance to South Africa have been created. These are: (1) the self-confidence of the ruling class; (2) the capabilities of the opposition; (3) flashpoints; and (4) instability from unexpected or unlikely sources. The indicators are intended to give an early warning of developments six months to two years out.

2. *Are English-speaking South Africans tending to separate their future from that of the country?* (It was generally conceded that many, perhaps most, South Africans of English origin would leave South Africa rather than either live in a black-governed state or fight a last-ditch battle against black majority rule.)

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The Self-Confidence of the Ruling Class

Academic theories of revolution make a convincing case that the most important category of indicators concerns the self-confidence of the ruling class. In

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Subindicators:

- Are the English as a group giving greater emphasis to their differences with the Afrikaners, especially on race relations?
- Are the English tending to separate themselves from positions of authority in the government or military?
- Are the English complaining about military service?
- Are homes coming on the market in such numbers as to drive down real estate prices in English residential areas?
- Are the English investing in easily portable luxury goods—diamonds or oceangoing yachts, for example—during an economic downturn? (Such purchases would not necessarily be an indicator in times of increasing prosperity.)
- Are English-controlled banks shortening maturities on long-term loans?
- Are English-controlled firms seeking to reduce their exposure in South Africa?

3. *Has there been a breakdown or persistent decline in the provision of "civilized" services?* (Many white South Africans, both English and Afrikaner, take great pride in the punctuality of South African trains and planes, the purity of the tap water, the good condition of the streets and highways, the relative absence of "Third World-style" corruption, and so forth. They maintain that these achievements differentiate South Africa from other Sub-Saharan nations. Some respondents believed that a marked decline in any of these areas, if not quickly corrected, could plant the seeds of self-doubt among white South Africans.)

Subindicators:

- Are "social statistics"—infant mortality, caloric intake, unemployment, and so forth—for whites falling behind those of Europe and North America?
- Have there been a spate of electrical "brownouts" or plane or train accidents clearly due to faulty maintenance?

- Have well-known government, military, business, or religious figures been exposed as being involved in corruption or other wrongdoing, as they were in the 1976-77 "Muldergate" scandal?
- In the event of a major natural disaster (fire, drought, cyclone, and so forth), is the government response seen as inadequate or ill managed?
- Are phrases such as "You'd think you were in Angola" coming to be heard among critical white South Africans?

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4. *Are far-right Afrikaner parties growing at the expense of the ruling National Party?* (Most respondents believed that the far-right Conservative Party and Herstigte National Party would gradually wither away. If this does not happen, Afrikaner support for the government could be undermined and the ruling class split.)

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Subindicators:

- Is the Afrikaner man-on-the-street beginning to say that the National Party has become too liberal? That it has become too English? That it no longer represents true Afrikaner values?
- Are some influential voices beginning to stress the importance of uniting all Afrikaners even if it means alienating English South Africans, dropping reforms, and spurning international opinion?
- Are some Afrikaner politicians being described as "traitors to the Volk?"
- Is cooperation between the two far-right parties increasing?

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5. *Is the government abandoning recent reforms and, in general, taking a more hardline attitude on political and social matters?* (Almost all respondents stressed that the government tended to be more liberal when it felt secure and to adopt more reactionary attitudes when it felt threatened. Thus, a return to the very hard line would indicate that the regime was worried—perhaps, with reason.)

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25X1*Subindicators:*

- Are government officials associated with reform losing power or popularity?

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- Are foreign or domestic initiatives considered to be successful by foreign observers being described as failures inside South Africa?
- Is the government dropping or downplaying attempts to co-opt the Indian and Colored communities?
- Are the provisions of the Influx Control Laws and the Group Areas Act being applied more strictly?
- Are de facto advances in the area of petty apartheid being reversed?
- Is police brutality increasing?
- Are judicial attempts to reduce or punish police brutality being sidetracked? ☐

6. *Are external factors turning against the regime?* (Although all respondents believed that the Afrikaner elite would not be greatly affected by external pressures, most thought that certain external events could undermine regime confidence at the margin.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Is Israel moving away from South Africa to reestablish relations with black African states?
- Are "unfriendly" governments coming to power in the United States or the United Kingdom?
- Are major multinational firms closing their operations in South Africa?
- Has there been a further fall in the price of gold?
- Are recent agreements with Mozambique and other black African states coming apart? ☐

7. *Are military losses abroad or civilian losses to terrorism at home reaching "unacceptable" levels?* (Most respondents believed that white support—especially among English South Africans—for government military policies depended upon relatively low casualty rates. No observer was prepared to say what rates would prove unacceptable. Few believed that domestic terrorism could reach levels that would affect policy in the foreseeable future.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Are casualty rates sharply increasing?
- Has there been a battle in which the South African forces have lost more men than their black African or Cuban opponents?
- Is the press talking about "military blunders" or "waste of lives?"

- Is there a public perception that certain groups—English-speaking South Africans or ex-Rhodesians, for example—are taking more than their share of casualties?
- Is Israeli military strategy—which the South Africans recognize as being almost identical to their own—being rethought by Israeli military leaders?
- Is the pace of domestic terrorism increasing?
- Are nongovernment white civilians being targeted?
- Are police methods against terrorism perceived by many white South Africans as being ineffective? ☐

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The Capabilities of the Opposition

Our second set of indicators concerns the capabilities of the opposition. Although most respondents believed that the overwhelming majority of the black population was deeply opposed to the South African political system, few thought that the opposition had the unity, the leadership, the external support, or the internal organization to pose a credible threat to the regime in the near future. The following indicators are intended to monitor opposition progress in making up these deficits. ☐

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1. *Is detribalization progressing?* (Most respondents believed that ethnic, linguistic, and tribal loyalties were an important barrier to black unity. They further believed that these barriers were slowly breaking down under the pressures of urbanization and modernization. Respondents differed, however, on the extent of the threat presented by tribal blacks. Some emphasized that the tribal blacks were more conservative and less likely to challenge the government, while others stressed the advantages that tribal blacks had over detribalized blacks in terms of leadership, organization, communication, and unity.) ☐

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Subindicators:

- Is the rate of black urbanization increasing?
- Are intermarriages among different tribal and linguistic groups becoming more common?
- Are nontribal organizations—political, religious, or other—becoming more popular in tribal homelands?

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- Are traditional tribal leaders talking of black unity beyond the group or throwing support to nontribal organizations or leaders?
- Are detribalized blacks giving support to a charismatic tribal leader? ☐

2. *Are labor unions becoming more politicized?* (Most respondents believed that the labor unions were the existing organizations most likely to provide leadership and channels of communication for a nationwide black opposition movement. They cautioned, however, that the unions were closely watched by the South African security services and that overt steps toward a more political role would probably be severely dealt with.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Is the labor movement producing charismatic black leaders?
- Is the primacy of a single black leader being recognized?
- Are unions taking action on "bread-and-butter issues" that increasingly border on the political?
- Is the government letting them get away with such actions?
- Are there any indications of a secret leadership behind and across existing overt union leaderships—a kind of black Broederbond?
- Are rivalries among unions and union leaders declining?
- Are unions forming ties with tribal, religious, or cultural groups?
- Do the unions have good relations with insurgent organizations?
- Are unions receiving favorable international publicity and strong foreign support? ☐

3. *Are black religious groups becoming more politicized?* (While most respondents played down the idea that any religious group—black or white—could have much effect on the situation in South Africa, several noted that the best organized and most disciplined nationwide black group was the Zion Christian Church (ZCC). They stressed that this large religious group and other sycretistic movements were completely nonpolitical but admitted that, if it ever became political, it could be a powerful opposition force.) (S NF)

Subindicators:

- Are there any indications of a change in leadership—or leadership thinking—in the ZCC or other movements?
- Is the ZCC making contact with other black groups? 25X1
- Are ZCC members, already organized in a quasi-military fashion, according to some respondents, engaging in organized "sports" activities that could have a military training application?
- Are ZCC members working their way into key positions in political organizations?
- Are other sycretistic religious organizations growing up that could rival the ZCC?
- Are South African security services unable to penetrate the ZCC or other religious movements? 25X1

4. *Has the ANC, PAC, or other armed opposition group obtained secure base areas or supply lines in adjacent black African countries?* (No insurgency has been successful in recent years without a relatively secure base area either in an adjacent foreign country or in an isolated area of the home country where the national government exercises little or no control. As no such isolated areas exist in South Africa, insurgents will have to depend upon safehavens in friendly neighboring countries. Recent government agreements with Mozambique and other black African states appear to be a major step in reducing the ANC presence on South Africa's borders.) ☐ 25X1

Subindicators:

- Are there any indications that agreements with Mozambique and other countries may be abrogated by either side? 25X1
- Do the governments of neighboring countries have the ability to control the ANC or other anti-South African groups on their own soil?
- Are the Soviets, Cubans, or African states putting effective pressure on neighboring states to break agreements with South Africa?
- Are rightwing elements putting pressure on the South African Government to break agreements with neighboring states?

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- Is the South African military going around the foreign policy establishment to continue to aid anti-government guerrillas in Mozambique or elsewhere? ☐

5. *Are prosperous, middle-class blacks taking risks to assume leadership roles in the wider black community?* (Some respondents commented that revolutions were almost always led by dissatisfied members of the middle class and that this possibility existed in South Africa. Other respondents considered that the creation of a black middle class was serving to break black unity by giving some blacks a stake in the system. Both sets of respondents may be right; the majority of the black middle class may be co-opted, while certain members of the middle class may be highly dissatisfied and ready to lead an attack on the system.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Is the black middle class failing to make progress against petty apartheid in areas such as housing, entertainment, education, and so forth?
- Has any well-known black sports or entertainment figure courted arrest or economic losses by statements or symbolic actions?
- Is class feeling declining within the black community, that is, do poor blacks feel more kinship than antagonism toward rich blacks?
- Are wealthy blacks becoming more concerned with what they cannot have under the South African system—housing commensurate with their income, political rights, and so forth—and less impressed with the advantages they have over other blacks in the country or elsewhere in Africa?
- Does a middle-class person living in one of the black townships have more to fear from the South African establishment or from other members of the black community, that is, is there a penalty to be paid for supporting the system?
- Do middle-class blacks who speak out against the system become heroes in the international media?

- Are the South African security services divided on how to treat respected, middle-class blacks who engage in minor antiregime actions? ☐

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6. *Are black opposition figures able to spread their ideas through the media?* (Although South African censorship can be strict to the point of making certain individuals “nonpersons,” considerable implicit criticism is allowed in works of literature, in theatrical performances, and in the English-language press and radio. Books, newspapers, and radiobroadcasts in the African languages would seem to offer certain blacks a national forum, especially as many of the government censors are unlikely to understand all the nuances of the native languages.) ☐

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Subindicators:

- Is radio and television service in native languages popular with black audiences?
- Are black-edited magazines and newspapers—in any language—being established?
- Are works by black authors being read even by relatively poor blacks?
- Is there a political content to the “jokes” told in Zulu or other languages during African dance programs?
- Are academic experts aware of any “subsystems of meaning” in any of the African languages commonly used in South Africa? ☐

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Flashpoints

If the regime is self-confident and the opposition is unorganized, even very serious spontaneous outbreaks of violence will have little lasting effect. If, however, the regime is divided and the opposition is united and resolute, such outbreaks could set off a mushrooming chain of events culminating in political chaos or in the overthrow of the government. ☐

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1. *Is there a large pool of unemployed black youth in the townships?* (Most respondents thought that high concentrations of idle black teenagers were necessary for grievances to turn into riots. ☐ during economic downturns, older blacks tend to concentrate on finding or keeping a job and thus are less likely to be politically active, while

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younger blacks have time on their hands and tend to be more active.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Is black urban unemployment high or increasing?
- Is the teenage crime rate in the black townships increasing?
- Are black township authorities, school officials, and so forth warning that the problem of unemployed youth could become explosive in their areas?
- Are youth crimes becoming more daring, involving larger gangs, adopting new methods, and so forth?

2. *Are blacks increasingly dissatisfied in matters related to education?* (Perhaps remembering the 1976 Soweto riots, most respondents thought that problems in the township schools would constitute the most likely flashpoints for the foreseeable future.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Are new school boycotts under way or rumored?
- Is there a demonstration effect, that is, are boycotts spreading from one area to another?
- Do many different areas have the same educational grievances?
- Are black students and parents vocally dissatisfied with the quality of curriculums, texts, teachers, and administrators?

3. *Are slum removals and resettlements continuing, and are they poorly planned and executed?* (After school problems, the respondents thought that forced resettlements were most likely to give rise to flash-point incidents.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Are resettlements carried out with excessive force?
- Have accidental—but preventable—deaths occurred as a result of moving the old or the sick?
- Are the new settlement areas grossly inferior to the old ones, especially with regard to transportation links and access to work?
- Are certain resettlements receiving widespread critical attention from the English-language and foreign press?
- Are resettlements being carried out without proper regard for seasons or weather conditions?

- Are there rumors that members of the white establishment are making large sums of money through land deals that hinge on resettlements?

4. *Are conditions in the black homelands deteriorating?* (A majority of the respondents believed that unrest in the black homelands, especially in those homelands near large South African cities, could be as destabilizing as unrest in South Africa proper.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Is economic recession causing urban blacks to lose their jobs and be sent back to the homelands?
- Is the drought and/or recession causing white farmers to reduce their black work force?
- Is the South African Government refusing to give the homeland governments adequate financial support?
- Are unemployment, poverty, and malnutrition increasing in the homelands?
- Are blacks turning against the homeland leadership?
- Is police brutality on the part of the homeland authorities increasing?

5. *Have there been sudden sharp increases in the price or decreases in the availability of basic commodities and services?* (Many respondents thought that reasonably cheap and plentiful cornmeal and stable transportation costs for commuters were necessary to prevent unrest.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Are black customers considering boycotts of certain goods or services?
- Are such boycotts threatened on a nationwide level?
- Are government financial problems such that the removal of subsidies on basic goods and services is likely?
- Are cutbacks in public transportation to and from black—but not white—areas being planned?
- Is drought and/or import problems creating shortages of corn?

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- Are imports of basic foods being cut back in order to import goods of less apparent social value? (S NF)

6. *Has there been a well-publicized incident in which petty apartheid rules were blindly enforced with tragic results?* (Respondents agreed that, as the enforcement of some petty apartheid rules has been relaxed, a state of uncertainty has been created in the black community. People are not quite sure what they can and cannot do. The possibilities for misunderstanding and friction are great.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Have there been notorious cases in which emergency hospital admission for a nonwhite has been denied or delayed for racial reasons with fatal results?
- Have there been notorious cases in which respected blacks—including foreign blacks or homeland leaders—have been subjected to purposely demeaning treatment by low-level white officials?
- Have nonpolitical blacks caught in police roundups suffered injury or death—even accidentally—while in custody? ☐

Instability From Unexpected or Unlikely Sources

To counteract any possible tendency to be mesmerized by the *swart gevaar*—the black danger—the respondents were asked to speculate on “unlikely” but possible sources of political instability. ☐

1. *Is the South African military dissatisfied enough with the civilian government to consider a coup?* (Well over half of their respondents did not consider a military coup possible under any foreseeable circumstances. A small number of respondents believed, however, that a coup was not only possible under certain circumstances but highly likely. According to these respondents, the military would be most likely to take action if it thought that the government was coming under the influence of far-right-wing civilians whose policies would make the task of maintaining security much more difficult.) ☐

Subindicators:

- Has a new prime minister come to power who is less in tune with the military establishment?
- Are military leaders speaking out in public to advise or warn the government on nonmilitary issues?
- Are civilian leaders telling the military to go back to the barracks and mind its own business?
- Is the military budget being cut at a time when the military feels that the country may be about to face new dangers?
- Are military pay, benefits, and prestige falling relative to those of civilians? ☐ 25X1
- Are far-right civilians establishing plans to indoctrinate military recruits without the knowledge or consent of the high command? ☐ 25X1

2. *Does a two-party white political system appear to be developing?* (Several respondents maintained that the appearance of a second strong political party—of whatever orientation—alongside the National Party would throw the South African political system into chaos. They contended that, without a single dominant party, major policy initiatives either in the direction of reform or repression would be impossible. In this situation, not only the regime but also the system might not survive its first crisis.) ☐ 25X1

Subindicators:

- Is the National Party moving to the left, gaining English (and perhaps Colored and Indian) support while losing Afrikaner support? ☐ 25X1
- Have the two rightwing Afrikaner parties formed an effective union?
- Are personal rivalries and ambitions among politicians encouraging the development of a multiparty system?
- Are foreign governments using their influence to encourage a two-party system as part of an effort to bolster democracy in South Africa? ☐ 25X1

3. *Are antiapartheid groups considering a Gandhi-style civil disobedience campaign?* (One respondent, whose experience in South Africa goes back to the 1950s, stressed that the Afrikaner elite had become steadily “softer” and more open to “moral ☐ 25X1

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influences." He believed that, whereas past governments would not have hesitated to crush a nonviolent opposition movement, future governments would be increasingly reluctant to take such action. According to this individual, a nonviolent civil-disobedience program would be very hard for the government to counter, especially if it had the support of moderate black groups, white liberals, and the international media.) []

Subindicators:

- Are significant numbers of black radicals, including active members of the ANC, coming to believe that the South African Government cannot be defeated through violent methods?
- Are the tactics of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and others receiving greater attention among black and white opposition groups in South Africa?
- Have any of the established churches come out in favor of such methods?
- Are some influential whites, previously considered conservative, letting it be known that they consider nonviolence to be a praiseworthy step away from terrorism and guerrilla activity?
- Has a charismatic black leader come to be associated with nonviolent civil disobedience?
- Are the international media giving more attention to such activity?
- Has an incident of police overreaction to a nonviolent, multiracial march or other event led to widespread criticism of police tactics within the elite? []

4. *Are South African blacks losing their "love of country"?* (Several respondents who had served elsewhere in black Africa remarked that South African blacks were much more attached to their country, despite its political system, than tended to be the case elsewhere in the Third World. They pointed out that black South African recipients of US Government scholarships to study in the United States almost always returned to South Africa. They claimed that this was true of no other Third World country. These respondents all believed very strongly that any diminution of this love of country would result in increased instability; they were not, however, able to describe the causal links.) []

Subindicators:

- Are increasing numbers of black scholarship holders not returning to South Africa?
- Are increasing numbers of blacks settling elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Are blacks ceasing to differentiate between the country and its political and social system?
- Has the creation of black homelands made some blacks feel that they are a part of neither South Africa nor a homeland? []

Conclusion

The [] countries treated in the political instability quarterly are worthy of attention not because they are unstable but because they are important. Except for a few coup-prone states of little interest to US policymakers, most Third World countries are politically stable most of the time, and events such as the Iranian and Nicaraguan Revolutions are few and far between. Nonetheless, because such events have far-ranging consequences for US interests, great efforts must be made to obtain early and accurate warning of potential instability. []

This is doubly true of South Africa. All respondents agreed that South Africa was currently stable, and most expected it to remain stable over the next decade at least. All were equally agreed that South African political instability—when and if it came—would be a matter of extreme concern to the US Government. Careful attention to the indicators in this paper, as well as to other indicators now being monitored, should give the South African analyst ample warning of any radical political change in this important country. []

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Africa Briefs

Nigeria

Dim Outlook for IMF Agreement ☐

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General Buhari's government apparently intends to avoid reaching a final agreement with the IMF for as long as possible while looking for other sources of financing. Senior Nigerian financial officials met in Washington with top IMF officials last week. Devaluation remains the major obstacle, and Lagos continues to argue that a large devaluation would raise prices to unacceptable levels. A senior official says Nigeria is now willing, however, to compromise on two other key issues: trade liberalization and petroleum subsidies. Lagos probably hopes that the recent reduction in the money supply resulting from a currency conversion and a new austerity budget will convince the Fund to reach an agreement. ☐

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Economic decision making within the Buhari government continues to be haphazard and uncoordinated. The US Embassy reports that there is growing domestic pressure on the government not to negotiate a Fund agreement. Many Nigerians increasingly view a hike in oil production and exports as a preferable alternative to the painful adjustments required under an IMF-supported loan program. (C NF)

Somalia

Cabinet Shuffle ☐

25X1

The Somali Government shuffle earlier this month does not portend any overall policy changes. Two longtime advisers to President Siad have had their status reconfirmed. First Vice President and Defense Minister Mohamed Ali Samantar retained his cabinet post, and no changes were announced for the Defense Ministry, despite persistent reports of a substantial shakeup. Ahmed Suleiman Abdalle was appointed head of the new Ministry of Interior, which controls the Police. He may also reacquire direct control of the National Security Service, which is responsible for domestic foreign intelligence if it is placed under his ministry. ☐

25X1

Several changes took place in the economic ministries, which the US Embassy interprets as a clear signal of Siad's dissatisfaction with the personnel who negotiated tentatively the IMF agreement rejected in February. Siad transferred or dropped virtually the entire economic team, including the most experienced and capable subcabinet-level officials. Although the new Minister of Finance is reportedly in favor of the IMF-proposed reforms, in our judgment, negotiations with the IMF now are likely to be even more cumbersome. Government officials, fearful of losing their positions, will be more careful to ensure Siad's concurrence with any future agreement. The regime's continuing reluctance to deal with

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Somalia's chronic economic problems could lead to strains in relations with the Western donor community to which Mogadishu will look for increased economic assistance. ☐

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South Africa**Boycott of Nonwhite Elections** ☐

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President Chris Dlamini of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) told the US Embassy that his organization plans to distribute pamphlets calling for a boycott of the elections for Colored and Indian seats in the new tricameral Parliament. The predominantly black labor federation has occasionally spoken out on political issues, but it has eschewed an active role to avoid the government harassment that usually results when a black union strays from pursuing economic goals. Although a modest step, we regard the move as noteworthy since FOSATU is the largest (over 100,000 members), best organized, and most successful of the new labor groups that have formed since the government decided in 1979 to recognize black unions and allow their participation in collective bargaining. ☐

25X1

Like all black labor groups in South Africa, FOSATU is highly vulnerable to government countermeasures. The group's leadership, in our view, may believe there is some safety in numbers as FOSATU joins the many leftist and rightist groups of all races that have sharply criticized the new Constitution. If the government does not force FOSATU to pay an excessive price, other labor groups that have refrained from political activity may be encouraged to follow FOSATU's lead. ☐

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